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Apple’s Big Win Highlights 
Uncertainty in Valuing Tech 
Investments
By: Tom Hopkins, CEO, Fortisure Consulting L.P., 
and Kara Boatman, Senior VP, Fortisure Consulting, L.P.
Abstract
Apple’s victory against Samsung in 2012 reaffirms the power of patents and the extent to which they drive profits in the technology sector.1 It also highlights the fact that the precise contribution of intellectual property (“IP”) to firm value is 
a matter of perspective.  Technology companies must value IP every time they engage in 
M&A activity, intercompany technology licensing, or tax-motivated IP migration.  Significant 
methodological differences in each area create potential pitfalls for firms and practitioners in 
an increasingly skeptical investor and regulatory environment. 
The profusion of IP litigation presents an additional challenge to technology companies.  
Expert witnesses and technology-savvy jurors can reach widely divergent conclusions 
regarding IP value.  Moreover, those valuations are likely to differ substantially from results 
reached in the course of purchase price allocation and transfer pricing studies.  Careful 
management of the preparation and dissemination of these analyses may allow firms to avoid 
costly misinterpretations of the results.  
1 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Introduction  
Apple’s 2012 victory against Samsung reaffirms the value of patents and the extent to which 
they drive profits in the technology sector.  
It also highlights the fact that the precise 
contribution of intellectual property (“IP”) 
to firm value is not easily measurable.  In 
Apple v. Samsung, Apple’s experts estimated 
that the company losses were in excess of 
$2.5 billion as a result of Samsung’s patent 
infringement.  Samsung’s experts countered 
with a figure closer to $520 million.  The 
jury awarded $1.05 billion.  Which of these 
calculations, if any, approximates the true 
value of the infringed patents?
Questions about IP value extend well 
beyond the courtroom. Technology companies 
are faced with these questions every time they 
engage in merger and acquisition (“M&A”) 
activity, intercompany 
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technology licensing, or tax-motivated IP 
migration.  Global technology firms often 
pursue these strategies simultaneously and, 
because valuation results are highly sensitive 
to their analytical context, companies may 
find themselves in the uncomfortable position 
of defending very different assessments of 
the value of their technology.  Understanding 
accepted methodologies and their respective 
and comparative impact on estimates of IP 
value can facilitate a coordinated approach 
to these analyses.  Well-reasoned and 
supported IP valuations may also avoid costly 
proceedings with courts, financial regulators 
and tax authorities.
The Challenge of IP Valuation
IP drives enterprise value in technology-
based economies.   Unprotected sources of 
competitive advantage – know-how, processes 
and talent, to name a few - dissipate quickly 
in markets “turbo-charged” by immediate and 
continuous access to information.  It’s no 
surprise, then, to see companies like Apple 
vigorously defend their IP when they believe it 
has been unlawfully appropriated.  As a result 
IP claims continue to escalate, with litigants 
expending enormous resources to quantify 
the value of the disputed IP.   
Even absent litigation, companies pay 
close attention to IP, continuously searching 
for new ways to extract value from existing 
IP and hunting for sources of valuable new 
technology.  Google’s 2012 $12.5 billion 
acquisition of Motorola Mobility was part of 
a specific strategy to expand the market for 
its Android operating system and protect its 
smartphone manufacturing partners.
IP exploitation enhances shareholder 
value by generating competitive advantages 
that result in higher profits.  Firms devote 
substantial resources to research and 
development (“R&D”) activity, aggressively 
pursue IP through M&A, or employ a 
combination of both strategies.  In addition, 
companies may extract additional benefits 
from IP, either by deploying it simultaneously 
in several locations worldwide or by structuring 
and/or migrating R&D activities to reduce 
income tax liability.   
In the case of M&A, U.S. and 
international regulations require that the 
acquiring entity report the value of the IP it has 
purchased in order to promote transactional 
transparency.  If the company is migrating 
R&D activity or licensing the resulting IP to its 
cross-border affiliates, tax authorities require 
an IP valuation analysis in order to ensure 
compliance with the arm’s length standard 
and associated transfer pricing regulations. 
Financial reporting and transfer pricing 
documentation requirements are not new; 
most companies are familiar with the accepted 
approaches to IP valuation for business 
combination studies and intercompany pricing 
analyses.  Valuation and transfer pricing 
practitioners are aware of the differences in 
these approaches and the need to coordinate 
the respective analyses, especially when 
they involve exchanges of the same or similar 
technology at roughly the same time.
But the recent increase in IP litigation 
involving the biggest names in the technology 
sector presents an additional challenge to 
technology companies.  Expert witnesses 
and technology-savvy jurors can reach widely 
divergent conclusions regarding IP value.1  
1 The Apple versus Samsung jury “ignored paid 
experts” and calculated the damage award itself. (2012, 
August 27). “Apple Victory Shifts Power Balance.”  The Wall 
Well-reasoned and supported IP 
valuations may also avoid costly 
proceedings with courts, financial 
regulators and tax authorities.
Moreover, those valuations are likely to differ 
substantially from results reached in the course 
of purchase price allocation and transfer 
pricing studies, compounding the confusion.  
In an increasingly skeptical investor and 
regulatory environment, companies can ill 
afford suspicions that they have manipulated 
courts, investors or regulators, by proposing 
different valuations of IP to suit their purposes 
in each area.
Even absent direct involvement 
in IP litigation, technology companies 
should anticipate more challenges to their 
intercompany royalty studies and purchase 
price allocation analyses as information from 
high-profile litigation becomes public.  The 
fact that significant differences exist across 
accepted methodologies in each area creates 
potential pitfalls for firms and practitioners 
alike.
Understanding these differences will 
not only allow firms to anticipate and respond 
to challenges, but may encourage a more 
coherent approach to IP valuation in the first 
place.2
Reasonable Royalty Approach
The U.S. Patent Act allows a prevailing 
plaintiff in a patent infringement suit to recover 
compensatory damages for the economic 
harm caused by the infringer.3 Ideally, a 
Street Journal, p. A1.  (2012, August 25).  Elmer-DeWitt, 
Philip.  “Apple v. Samsung:  Meet the Foreman of the Jury.” 
Retrieved from http//www.fortune.cnn.com.  Occasionally, 
the difference between the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s expert 
valuation is so extreme and the analyses so complex, that 
the court or jury is suspected of “splitting the difference” in 
awarding damages.
2  For ease of discussion, IP valuation for financial 
reporting purposes will hereinafter be referred to as  
“financial valuation” or the “financial reporting approach,” 
while IP valuation for intercompany pricing purposes will 
be referred to as “transfer pricing valuation” or the “transfer 
pricing approach.”
3  U.S. Patent Act (2012), 35 USC §284 (1952). 
damage award is based upon a determination 
of profits lost to the plaintiff as a result of the 
infringement.  However, in cases where lost 
profits cannot be determined, either because 
the claimant has not lost sales to the infringer 
or because the calculation of lost profits is 
considered too speculative, the courts will 
accept a royalty analysis.  In fact, even if lost 
profits can be determined, the Patent Act 
requires that, at a minimum, damages should 
reflect a “reasonable royalty” for use of the IP 
by the infringer.
The reasonable royalty approach 
posits a hypothetical negotiation between 
a willing licensor (the plaintiff) and licensee 
(the alleged infringer). The negotiation is 
assumed to take place on the date of first 
infringement.  While the term “reasonable 
royalty” has no economic meaning, in order 
to be acceptable to both parties it must leave 
each better off than had it pursued other 
available alternatives.  In the case of the 
alleged infringer, these alternatives include 
the possibility of designing around the 
patent to achieve comparable functionality 
without infringement.  In cases where such 
a non-infringing alternative is feasible, the 
reasonable royalty cannot be higher than 
the design-around cost.  Assessment of any 
alternatives yields a range bounded by the 
minimum acceptable royalty for the licensor 
and the maximum acceptable royalty to the 
licensee.  
Typically, the courts accept a royalty 
analysis based on the IP-related profits 
anticipated by the infringer at the time of 
the hypothetical negotiation.  In general, the 
royalty leaves the infringer with a portion of 
these intangible profits.4 The argument is that 
Retrieved from http://www.uspto.gov
4 The courts may accept royalty rates on the high end 
of the range in cases of willful infringement, which was the 
principal finding in Apple v. Samsung.  In addition, while 
the hypothetical negotiation is assumed to take place on 
the date of first infringement, courts sometimes consider 
2
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the hypothetical licensee would not agree 
to a royalty that did not allow it to earn a 
“reasonable” profit; economics dictates that 
the licensee would be willing to accept any 
royalty that results in higher profits than the 
next best alternative.  
Financial Reporting Approach5 
For financial statement reporting 
purposes, an intangible asset is defined as one 
that is identifiable, “lacks physical substance” 
and is not a financial asset.6   As long as that 
asset arises from legal or contractual rights, the 
asset will be recognized apart from goodwill.  
Intangible assets may be marketing-related, 
customer-related, artistic-related, contract-
based or technology-based; this category of 
assets clearly includes patented technology.   
When a U.S. firm makes an acquisition, 
it must recognize the assets acquired and 
liabilities assumed, and adjust for any non-
controlling interest in the acquired entity.  
The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) codified these requirements in ASC 
805, which requires firms to use the purchase 
method of accounting when reporting 
business combinations.  That is, the acquiring 
firm records the price of the merger as it 
subsequent information, especially if it supports a higher 
royalty rate. In both cases, the court’s discretion is designed 
to reinforce the punitive nature of the damages award.
5  The reporting requirements described here are 
based on Financial Accounting Standards Board statements. 
However, by design, they correspond closely to international 
reporting requirements.
6  Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Business Combinations (revised 2007) Paragraph 3.  
Retrieved from http://www.fasb.org
would the cost of any asset and allocates the 
price to the tangible, financial and intangible 
assets acquired.  Assets must be recognized 
at fair value, defined as the price at which an 
asset could be bought or sold in a current 
transaction between market participants.7
ASC 350 addresses how acquired 
intangibles should be accounted for in 
financial statements, both upon and following 
their acquisition.  It prohibits the amortization 
of goodwill and some intangible assets, 
where goodwill is defined as the excess of 
the purchase price over the fair market value 
of net assets.  The value of any amortized 
intangibles, those intangible assets that arise 
from contractual or legal rights or are separable 
from other assets, must be documented 
and supported by financial analysis.8   ASC 
805 and ASC 350 effectively require firms 
to recognize and value intangible assets on 
an individual basis, in order to provide more 
relevant and reliable information to investors.
Financial valuations begin with the 
acquisition price and rely primarily on 
discounted future cash flows and balance 
sheet analysis.  Any excess of the purchase 
price over the fair value of tangible assets is 
attributed to intangible assets and/or goodwill.  
Intangible assets must then be identified and 
their value separately derived.   Any remaining 
value is classified as goodwill.9 
7  FASB.(2009). ASC 805 Business Combinations.  
Retrieved from http://www.fasb.org
8 FASB.(2009). ASC 350  Goodwill Valuations for 
Financial Reporting.  Retrieved from http://www.fasb.org
9 If the sum of fair values of the assets exceeds the 
acquisition price, the transaction is viewed as a “bargain 
purchase” and the gain is recorded on the acquiring entity’s 
The FASB accepts three general approaches to intangible asset 
valuation:  the market approach, the income approach and the 
cost approach.
The FASB accepts three general 
approaches to intangible asset valuation:  the 
market approach, the income approach and 
the cost approach.  In the market approach, 
intangible asset value is determined by 
reference to similar assets that have been sold 
or licensed.  If such market transactions can be 
identified, the terms of those transactions are 
used to establish the value of the intangible 
in question.   Increasingly, analysts recognize 
that IP - by its very nature - exhibits unique 
characteristics and capabilities, and that the 
probability of identifying truly comparable 
sales or licenses is low.  
Absent reliable market evidence, the 
intangible may be valued using the income 
approach.  A discounted cash flow model is 
constructed, based on assumptions regarding 
growth, profitability, competition, risk, and 
asset life.  The model then calculates the 
present value of the stream of future profits 
attributable to the intangible asset in question. 
Under the income approach, an 
intangible asset’s value is calculated over its 
“useful life:” the period of time over which the 
asset is expected to contribute to the reporting 
entity’s (i.e. the buyer’s) cash flows.  As long 
as the asset is contributing or expected to 
contribute to future cash flows, it will attract a 
portion of the firm’s value.  The useful life of 
patented technology is typically viewed as the 
remaining life of the patent.  
Finally, the cost approach may be 
used.  This approach relies on the principle 
of replacement cost to estimate asset value, 
and is typically used to value intangible assets 
such as engineering know-how or technical 
drawings.  The cost approach implicitly 
assumes that value is somehow tied to cost. 
In fact, there is no economic link between the 
development cost associated with a particular 
technology and the value it ultimately 
generates.  A cost approach, therefore, is 
income statement.
unlikely to yield a correct estimate of value, 
except in rare circumstances.
Comparison of the Reasonable 
Royalty and Financial Reporting 
Approaches
If the market approach is used to value 
IP in a financial reporting analysis, there is no 
reason to believe that the determination of 
value would differ from a reasonable royalty 
approach using the same methodology.   The 
difficulty arises when the financial valuation 
and the reasonable royalty calculation both 
rely on the income approach.  
The financial valuation analysis relies 
on balance sheet data, while a reasonable 
royalty calculation typically relies on a profit 
analysis.  This difference in methodologies 
should not result in different IP values; since 
corporate assets generate cash flows through 
time, an asset’s value is a stock measure of the 
discounted cash flows the asset is expected 
to create.  The important distinction between 
the two approaches is in their respective 
starting points.
The financial valuation is a “top-down” 
analysis, in which the market value of the firm 
is reflected in the acquisition cost.  Although 
the FASB has increased the focus on 
individual intangible asset identification and 
valuation, financial reporting analyses are 
still intended to allocatethetotal acquisition 
cost across a variety of candidate tangible 
The financial valuation is a 
“top-down” analysis, in which 
the market value of the firm is 
reflected in the acquisition cost
3
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and intangible assets.    The firm’s purchase 
price often includes a premium over a value 
calculated strictly on the basis of expected 
future profits.   This premium reflects a variety 
of factors, including current stock market 
conditions, anticipated synergies, majority 
control and other benefits attributable to the 
anticipated business combination.  Arguably, 
such a premium should be allocated entirely 
to goodwill.  In practice, however, some 
portion of this premium may be attributed to 
the firm’s IP.     
The reasonable royalty approach, in 
contrast, represents a purely “bottom-up” 
analysis.  The purpose of the exercise is to 
determine the value of a particular piece of IP, 
not of the entire firm.  No premium value can 
be allocated to the IP, because the market 
value of the firm as a whole has not been 
determined.  
Which analysis correctly assesses 
the value of the IP?  Recall the definition 
of economic value:  it is derived from an 
asset’s ability to generate income.  Markets 
are hypothetically efficient, and in theory 
a firm’s market price should reflect the 
economic value of its assets.  However, the 
market may experience a temporary shock, 
or disequilibrium, causing the market value 
of a public company to rise and fall from day 
to day.  Moreover, bidding wars can emerge 
for private or public companies, with resulting 
price spikes. At a particular point in time, 
therefore, the purchase price may not reflect 
the true economic value of the underlying 
assets.  Allocating that purchase price to 
a firm’s individual intangible assets may 
introduce “noise” into the asset valuation, 
distorting economic value. The difficulty arises 
because the analytical starting point is the 
sale of an entire firm, rather than the licensing 
of an individual asset, notwithstanding the 
FASB’s focus on an asset-by-asset analysis.
Note that the FASB does not advocate 
the allocation of a purchase price premium 
to firm IP.  Recent changes to business 
combination accounting requirements were 
intended to increase the focus on individual 
intangible asset identification and valuation 
and to increase transparency in the financial 
reporting of acquisitions.  To the extent that 
distortions in estimates of IP value occur, 
they result from firm incentives to attach as 
much of the purchase price as possible to 
intangible assets other than goodwill, since 
goodwill cannot be amortized.  Ironically, the 
increased transparency required by the FASB 
may increase firm incentives to overvalue 
intangible assets. 
How do these different approaches alter 
the estimated value of patented technology? 
If the purchase price includes a market-based 
premium, the technology may be valued more 
highly in a financial reporting analysis than in 
a reasonable royalty calculation.
Transfer Pricing Approach
For transfer pricing purposes, 
intangible asset valuation is required in a 
variety of circumstances.  Section 482 of the 
Internal Revenue Code and the underlying 
Regulations (commonly referred to as “the 
U.S. transfer pricing regulations”) require that 
all transfers of tangible and intangible property 
within a multinational enterprise (MNE) take 
place under terms that would prevail if the 
transacting entities were unrelated.  An MNE 
The reasonable royalty 
approach represents a purely 
“bottom-up” analysis….
because the market value of 
the firm as a whole has not 
been determined.
that wishes to license its patented technology 
to other related entities must determine an 
arm’s-length royalty payment.  The arm’s-
length analysis influences the portion of 
worldwide income that is earned in each tax 
jurisdiction, and consequently affects the 
MNE’s global tax liability.10
The U.S. transfer pricing regulations 
define an intangible asset as one that “…
has substantial value independent of the 
services of any individual…” and “derives 
its value not from its physical attributes but 
from its intellectual content or other intangible 
properties.”  The regulations identify categories 
of intangible property that closely resemble 
those in the FASB 
statements.  Implicit in 
the prescribed transfer 
pricing valuation 
m e t h o d o l o g i e s , 
however, is a focus on 
non-routine intangibles, 
or those that allow 
the company to earn 
supranormal returns. 
An intangible is considered valuable and 
non-routine as long as it generates profits 
beyond those attributable to routine functions 
(e.g., distribution and manufacturing).  
Profits associated with routine intangibles 
are indistinguishable from returns to routine 
functions, and consequently cannot be 
separately valued or transferred.  In a transfer 
pricing context, therefore, only a subset of 
what constitutes intangible assets for financial 
reporting purposes is at issue.  Patented 
technology may or may not constitute a 
valuable, non-routine intangible.  
U.S. transfer pricing regulations 
10  Internal Revenue Service, Department of the 
Treasury  IRC §§1.482-1 through 1.482-8 .  Retrieved 
from http://www.irs.gov.  The OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises imposes nearly 
identical requirements on firms with owned operations in 
member countries.
prescribe three methods for determining an 
arm’s-length price for the transfer of intangible 
property.11 The regulations direct the taxpayer 
to select the method that provides the most 
reliable measure of an arm’s-length result.  
Similar to the market approach in financial 
valuation, the comparable uncontrolled 
transaction (“CUT”) method may be used 
if the MNE member licenses comparable 
intangible property to or from an unrelated 
party.  The taxpayer can evaluate whether 
or not the intercompany exchange takes 
place at arm’s length by reference to the 
comparable uncontrolled transaction.  Absent 
such market evidence, transfer pricing 
regulations direct the MNE 
to profit-based methods, 
including the Comparable 
Profits Method (“CPM”) 
and the Profit Split Method 
(“PSM”).  The frequent 
lack of comparable market 
evidence requires that 
most analyses rely on 
these latter methods.12 
They begin with the 
identification of routine functions performed 
by the firm.  Arm’s-length returns to these 
functions are determined by reference to 
the profits of comparable independent firms.  
These routine profits are then subtracted 
from total operating profits and any residual 
profits are attributed to the intangible(s).  If 
the purpose of the analysis is to determine 
an arm’s-length royalty rate, these residual 
profits represent appropriate compensation 
11 The discussion refers to Reg. §1.482-47.  Reg. 
§1.482-7 addresses intangible transfers in the context of a 
cost sharing arrangement (CSA) between related parties. 
Additional methods (income, acquisition price, and market 
capitalization) may be applied to evaluate intangible asset 
transactions pursuant to a CSA.
12 While the PSM can be applied based on evidence 
from uncontrolled taxpayers, the arm’s length analysis 
typically defaults to a residual profit split.
In a transfer pricing 
context… only a subset of 
what constitutes intangible 
assets for financial reporting 
purposes is at issue
4
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to the owner of the intangible.13 
For transfer pricing purposes, the 
relevant life of an intangible asset is considered 
to be its “economic” life, or the period of time 
over which the asset generates supranormal 
profits.  The asset’s economic life is shorter 
than its useful life; its economic life ends 
when it no longer generates non-routine 
profits, while its useful life continues as long 
as it generates profits for GAAP purposes.  
On the surface, the transfer pricing 
approach to IP valuation appears to closely 
resemble the reasonable royalty approach.  
The purpose of the exercise is to determine 
the economic value of a particular non-routine 
intangible, or piece of IP, not of the entire 
firm.   In addition, absent market evidence 
(for comparable transactions or established 
royalty rates), both approaches typically rely 
on an estimate of future profits attributable to 
the intangible, rather than a balance sheet 
analysis.  However, the two approaches can 
generate significantly different results. 
First, recall that the transfer pricing 
analysis begins with operating profits, 
and then removes profits attributable to 
routine functions such as manufacturing 
and distribution.  The reasonable royalty 
approach removes the costs associated 
with manufacturing (e.g. depreciation, raw 
materials, labor) and distribution (e.g. sales 
and marketing expenses), but does not 
explicitly remove a return to those costs.  In 
this respect, the IP value suggested by the 
transfer pricing analysis is likely to be lower 
than the value implied by a reasonable royalty 
calculation.
Second, the transfer pricing analysis 
relies upon a shorter “economic life” than 
the useful life posited in both the financial 
13  In the case of multiple affiliate contributors to 
the development of valuable non-routine intangibles, the 
residual profits will be allocated according the relative size 
of the contributions.
valuation and reasonable royalty approaches.  
Assuming identical estimates of future profits 
associated with the IP, the transfer pricing 
analysis can generate a lower intangible 
asset value than a financial valuation or a 
reasonable royalty analysis.14 
Third, the transfer pricing analysis 
returns all of the excess profits attributable 
to the IP to the intangible asset owner in the 
form of a royalty.  In contrast, the reasonable 
royalty approach typically divides the value of 
the IP between the licensor and licensee.  This 
difference will likely decrease the reasonable 
royalty estimate relative to the transfer pricing 
royalty.15
Finally, while the reasonable royalty 
approach accounts for feasible non-infringing 
alternatives available to the licensee, the 
transfer pricing approach does not.  This 
difference will almost certainly drive the 
reasonable royalty lower than the transfer 
pricing royalty, since a reasonable royalty – 
by definition - shouldn’t cost the hypothetical 
licensor more than the cost of designing 
around the patent.
Implications and Conclusions 
While tax authorities and practitioners 
have expressly rejected court-determined 
damages awards as arm’s length evidence 
of intangible asset value for transfer pricing 
purposes, companies should not assume 
that the underlying expert analyses regarding 
14  If the likelihood of rapid technological advance is 
“built in” to the reasonable royalty calculation, its impact 
on cash flows would be to reduce the expected infringer 
profits attributable to the technology, thereby reducing 
the treasonable royalty.  This would offset the longer life 
assumed in the calculation and lower the implied value of 
the IP.
15  Only in rare cases will the profit division reflect 
the division between routine returns and returns to non-
routine intangibles implicit in the transfer pricing analysis, 
causing the two analyses to converge.
reasonable royalties can be entirely ignored.  
Experts testify that these analyses represent 
their best estimates of the value of intellectual 
property under certain circumstances and at 
a specific time.  By definition, the litigants are 
unrelated, so any hypothetical negotiation 
would satisfy the arm’s length principle.  To the 
extent that these expert analyses or resulting 
conclusions regarding reasonable royalties 
are disseminated publicly, companies may 
have to explain why their analyses of the 
same IP for transfer pricing or financial 
reporting purposes generate different results.  
Unfortunately, the methodology differences 
between the reasonable royalty, financial 
reporting and transfer pricing approaches 
don’t allow for straightforward conclusions as 
to which approach will generate the highest 
or lowest estimates of IP value.    
In the meantime, what are the 
implications of disparate valuation analyses?  
First, litigants may try to introduce either 
financial or transfer pricing IP valuations 
in an effort to discredit their adversaries, 
and/or as evidence of the firm’s “true” 
view of the value of the disputed patent.16  
Second, investors, financial regulators or tax 
authorities may examine the litigation history 
of the firm and attempt to use accessible 
information regarding reasonable royalty 
analyses as evidence of IP value in a tax or 
financial context.  A coordinated approach 
to IP analysis can reduce inconsistencies, 
but cannot eliminate them.   To the extent 
that firms and practitioners can manage the 
preparation, dissemination and clarification 
of these analyses, they may avoid costly 
misinterpretations of the results.
-----------
16  While these analyses are typically protected by 
attorney-client privilege, relationships in the technology 
world are complex.  For example, in spite of the recent 
case and ongoing litigation worldwide, Apple continues to 
purchase components from Samsung.
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